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Abstract
Exchange-traded Funds (ETFs) are easy to understand, cost-efficient ways of investing in
asset markets that have become very popular for both retail and institutional investors.
Investing in an index of assets via an ETF can generate quite complex and sometimes
counterintuitive investment behaviors on the level of individual assets. These dynamics
depend among others on the kind of market index, the types of traders in the market,
price trends in individual stocks and the overall market as well as situations of over-
or undervaluation of individual stocks and the index. Based on a heterogeneous agent
model we find that the presence of ETF chartists counterintuitively lowers the likelihood
of price bubbles in individual asset markets while at the same time weakening financial
stability as measured by asset price volatility and excess kurtosis.
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1 Introduction
From an investor’s point of view, Exchange-traded Funds (ETFs) are easy to understand
and cost-efficient investment vehicles that have become very popular for both institu-
tional and retail investors (Gastineau, 2010; Oura et al., 2015; Wiandt and McClatchy,
2002). While the typical ETF tracks the performance of an underlying stock index,
ETFs are also available for a wide variety of indices of other asset classes such as bonds
as well as commodities and for a broad spectrum of alternative investment strategies.
Important advantages of ETFs are low costs and high transparency due to the passive
investment approach as well as their high liquidity. It therefore comes as no surprise
that ETFs have seen an extraordinary growth since their introduction in the 1990s with
assets under management of around 3.4 trillion USD by mid-2016 (Kremer, 2016).
While the associated risks of financial institutions and instruments such as hedge
funds, money market funds, and other complex, high-profile segments of the asset man-
agement industry have been subject to close scrutiny, the ramifications of “plain-vanilla”
products such as ETFs are not yet well understood (Oura et al., 2015). Increasingly ques-
tions are asked whether and how their fast growth might affect financial stability and
financial market governance (The Economist, 2016; Fichtner et al., 2017; Ivanov and
Lenkey, 2014; Ockenfels and Schmalz, 2016b).
At first sight, the increased popularity of investing in indices made possible and
affordable by ETFs should increase financial stability as economic agents spread their
investment according to the underlying indices over a wide spectrum of assets. However,
a closer look makes clear that an appropriate analysis of financial stability also has to
take into account the strategies of the market participants. Trades by index orientated
investors obviously imply that the individual stocks are also sold and bought in a specific
way which reflects the relative weights of the individual stocks in the index giving rise
to non-trivial rebalancing effects.
Thus, ETF trading can imply very complex, seemingly counterintuitive trading
strategies on the level of the individual stocks depending on
• the strategy of ETF investors, e.g., fundamentalist or chartist,
• the price dynamics of the individual stocks, i.e., increasing or decreasing,
• the prices of the individual stocks relative to their fundamental values, i.e., situa-
tion of over- or undervaluation,
• the type of underlying index, e.g., assets being weighted by price or market capi-
talization.
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Take, e.g., a bull market in which stock A rises more slowly than the overall market
(index). An index chartist pursuing a trend following strategy would invest in such
situation, i.e., she would buy all stocks in the index according to their relative weight. If
the stocks in the index are price weighted as, e.g., in the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the relative weight of stock A in the index decreases as its price declines relative to the
remaining asset prices in the index.
The necessary rebalancing of the index implies that the index investor buys relatively
less of stock A and can even become a net seller, a behavior which is obviously opposite
to her trading on the level of the overall index. As a consequence of these complex
interactions seemingly destabilizing investment strategies such as trend following can
have stabilizing effects on the level of the individual stock while a fundamentalist on the
index level might induce instabilities on the level of individual stocks. Thus, depending
on specific price developments, rebalancing effects can imply that, e.g., trend following
index investors behave like fundamentalists for individual stocks.
While ETFs have grown substantially in assets, diversity, and market significance
in recent years, there exists only little analysis whether or how these developments
may affect the performance of asset markets. Ben-David et al. (2014) find that ETF
ownership of stocks leads to higher volatility and turnover. In contrast, Ivanov and
Lenkey (2014) find no empirical evidence for an increase in price volatility in the case
of leveraged ETFs. In their broadly based analysis of the asset management industry
Oura et al. (2015) identify risk-creating mechanisms even for seemingly simple financial
products such as ETFs. They conclude that larger funds do not necessarily contribute
to systemic risk. Rather it is the investment focus that appears to be relatively more
important. Research on index-based investment strategies is also related to work on the
role of institutional asset managers for financial asset prices. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011)
find that conditional volatilities of an index stock and aggregate stock market decrease
in the presence of benchmarking. Basak and Pavlova (2013) analyze the investment
behavior of institutional investors that care about their performance relative to a certain
index in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Their empirical results indicate that
this incentive increases stock market volatility and stronger correlation among stocks
that are included in the index.
To explicitly allow for different investment strategies and their interactions on the
level of the index and individual stocks, we follow Challet et al. (2015) and Drescher and
Herz (2012) and use a heterogeneous agent model (HAM) framework (Hommes, 2006)
to analyze how the increasing use of ETFs and other index-orientated financial products
alters the price dynamics of the underlying assets, possibly increasing risks for financial
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stability. Our simulation results indicate that it is not so much the presence of ETF funds
per se but rather the implemented investment strategy that might be a cause of concern.
In particular, we find that ETFs might jeopardize financial stability by increasing asset
price volatility and excess kurtosis if they are used by trend following chartists. At the
same time, the presence of ETF chartists lowers the likelihood of bubbles which can be
explained by smoothing effects.
In Section 2 we present some analytical findings on the effects of index based in-
vestment strategies and discuss some counterintuitive price effects that can result from
strategies of fundamentalists and chartists, in particular trend following feedback traders,
based on index funds. Section 3 studies these effects in greater detail in an HAM based
on Monte Carlo simulations. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Investment Strategies and Price Dynamics of Individual
Assets and Indices
In the following, we analytically investigate the relation between the price dynamics of
a stock index and its underlying individual stocks. We conduct some simple simulations
to illustrate how investment strategies on the level of an index can imply quite different
investment behavior on the level of the individual stocks of the index due to the rebal-
ancing caused by changes in the relative price of the underlying stocks. We define as
index both a publicly known set of assets that are considered to be representative for a
market as well as the price of that index which is defined as the sum of the (weighted)
prices of the index’s assets. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the price of the
index is available to all market participants at any time and at no costs.
For the case of an index in which stocks are price weighted, such as the Dow Jones
Industrial Average and the Nikkei 225, the implicit net asset position I`i (t) of an ETF
trader ` in stock i at time t is given by
I`i (t) = I
`(t) · pii(t) (1)
= I`(t) · pi(t)
p(t)
where I`(t) denotes trader `’s net asset position in the ETF with price p(t) =
∑N
j=1 pj(t).
With a market price pi(t), stock i’s relative weight in the index is pii(t).
Investments in an ETF imply trades in individual stocks according to two effects,
namely the level of the net asset position I`(t) (level or quantity effect) and the stocks’s
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relative weight pii(t) (rebalancing, price, or composition effect).
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To better understand how trading in ETFs implies specific tradings in the index’s
underlying stocks, we focus on the level and the rebalancing effect of ETF investments
for the underlying individual stocks as given in Equation (1). Given the previous net
asset position, its current investment in the index, and the index’s rebalancing dynamics,
we can determine an ETF trader’s investment in the individual stocks.
Proposition 1. The investment in stock i of an ETF trader ` with a net asset position
I` in period t is given by
∆I`i (t) = ∆I
`(t)pii(t) + I
`(t− 1)∆pii(t) (2)
Proof. It holds:
∆I`i (t) = I
`
i (t)− I`i (t− 1)
= I`(t)pii(t)− I`(t− 1)pii(t− 1)
= I`(t)pii(t)− I`(t− 1)pii(t) + I`(t− 1)pii(t)− I`(t− 1)pii(t− 1)
= ∆I`(t)pii(t) + I
`(t− 1)∆pii(t)
To better understand how ETF trading affects the implicit trading of the underlying
stocks and to motivate the subsequent Monte Carlo simulation analysis in Section 3, we
analyze the quantity and price dimensions of the investment in the individual stocks in
greater detail. First, the investment in an individual stock i depends on the investment
in the index given the relative weight of the stock in the index, i.e., ∆I`(t)pii(t) (level
effect). Secondly, the investment in individual stocks also depends on how the trader
reallocates his overall investment in the index due to changes in the relative weight of
the individual stocks, i.e., ∆pii(t) (rebalancing effect). The level effect, i.e., the first
summand of Equation (2), depends on the trader’s strategy and his investment ∆I`i (t),
whereas the rebalancing effect, the second summand, depends on the change of the
relative price of the stock, i.e., on market dynamics that cannot directly be influenced
by the trader. Thus, an ETF trader actively controls her investment only on the level
of the index, and passively tolerates the implications for investments on the level of the
individual assets. As the two effects can work in the same or in opposite directions, the
1Obviously, a trader’s gain is independent of trading in ETF shares or in the underlying stocks
according to Equation (1), see Appendix A.1 for a proof.
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net effect of index trading on indivdual stocks is a priori indeterminate and depends on
the relative size of the level and the rebalancing effects. The interactions of these two
effects can have complex and sometimes counterintuitive effects of ETF investments on
the underlying stocks, as we illustrate further below.
Obviously, the effects of ETFs on price and investment dynamics of individual stocks
depend substantially on the investment strategies of the ETF traders. In the following,
we compare investment decisions under specific price dynamics for different investment
strategies.2 In particular, we specify simple trading strategies for chartists, in particular
trend followers, and fundamentalists while differentiating between traders who invest
in individual stocks or ETF stock indices giving rise to four distinct types of traders,
namely chartists in individual stocks (C) and in ETFs (E-C) as well as fundamentalistic
investors in individual stocks (F) and ETFs (E-F).
To keep our analysis simple, we assume in this preliminary analysis that traders can
only invest or disinvest a constant amount ∆I per period and that price dynamics are
given, i.e., traders are price takers and too small to affect market prices. Therefore, we
denote chartists with constant investment with C∆ and fundamentalists with constant
investment with F∆. In our subsequent simulation analysis (see Section 3), we allow for
investments with varying size and allow traders to affect prices in the framework of an
HAM (Hommes, 2006).
Chartists in individual stocks (C∆) invest the amount ∆I according to
∆IC∆i (t) =

+∆I, pi(t) > pi(t− 1) ∧ t > 1,
−∆I, pi(t) < pi(t− 1) ∧ t > 1,
0, pi(t) = pi(t− 1) ∨ t = 0,
= ∆Isgn(pi(t)− pi(t− 1))It>0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
while ETF chartists (E-C∆) invest according to
∆IE−C∆(t) =

+N∆I, p(t) > p(t− 1) ∧ t > 1,
−N∆I, p(t) < p(t− 1) ∧ t > 1,
0, p(t) = p(t− 1) ∨ t = 0,
= N∆Isgn(p(t)− p(t− 1))It>0
2In the case of the buy-and-hold trader, the most simple type of trader in our analysis, there is no
difference between directly investing in the index’s stocks and investing in an ETF, see Appendix A.1.
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with N being the number of stocks in the index. Note that the investment of an ETF
chartist is diversified across the index according to Equation (1).
Analogously, fundamentalistic traders who invest in individual stocks (F∆) follow
∆IF∆i (t) =

+∆I, pi(t) < fi(t+ 1),
−∆I, pi(t) > fi(t+ 1),
0, pi(t) = fi(t+ 1),
= ∆Isgn(fi(t+ 1)− pi(t)) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
while fundamentalistic ETF traders (E-F∆) invest according to
∆IE−F∆(t) =

+N∆I, p(t) < f(t+ 1),
−N∆I, p(t) > f(t+ 1),
0, p(t) = f(t+ 1),
= N∆Isgn(f(t+ 1)− p(t))
for given expected fundamental values fi for all stocks i and respective fundamental
value of the index f =
∑N
i=1 fi. The market environment is non-stochastic, i.e., there is
no noise in the fundamentals.
In the subsequent scenario analysis, we assume an index with N = 30 stocks with
starting price p1−30(0) = 1 on time grid T = {0, 1, . . . , T = 250}. The price of stock
1 follows p1(t + 1) = p1(t)e
µ1
250 and the index develops according to p(t + 1) = p(t)e
µ
250
where µ1 > −1 and µ > −1 are fixed. The trends µ1 and µ are chosen so that pi(t) > 0 is
fulfilled for all t ∈ T and all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Additionally, we set 0 < fi ≡ f1 as constant
for all i and so f ≡ Nf1 is constant as well. (Dis)Investment per period is ±∆I = ±1.
The parameters under investigation are µ1, µ, and f .
Given this simple framework, we identify different scenarios in which ETF invest-
ments have interesting, seemingly counterintuitive effects on the level of individual stocks
due to the complex interactions of level and rebalancing effects.3
Scenario: modestly rising stock in a bull market We assume that the price of
stock 1 rises with trend µ1 = 0.1, while the price of the index grows with trend µ = 2, i.e.,
pi1, the relative price of stock 1, falls. All stocks are assumed to be overvalued relative to
3See Appendix A.3 for two additional scenarios in which ETF trading has counterintuitive effects on
individual stocks.
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Figure 1: Price paths p1 of stock 1 and
p2−30 of stocks 2-30.
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Figure 2: Change of the ratio pi1 and
pi2−30 of stock 1 and stocks 2-30, respec-
tively.
their fundamental values fi that are set to unity, i.e., pi > fi = 1 and p > f = 30 holds
(t > 0). Figures 1 and 2 display these price dynamics that underlie the four investment
strategies.
Given the price dynamics, how do the different traders allocate their funds? As the
prices of all stocks rise, chartists that either invest in individual stocks (C∆) or the index
(E-C∆) buy their respective target asset. As the stocks and the index are overvalued,
single stock (F∆) and index (E-F∆) orientated fundamentalists sell their respective target
assets.
Stock 1 as well as the other stocks have increases in price and are above their respec-
tive fundamental values (see Figure 1). However, stock 1 differs from the other stocks
as its relative price pi1 declines (see Figure 2). Chartists (C∆) invest in stock 1 as the
absolute price of stock 1 rises, while fundamentalists (F∆) disinvest as the stock is over-
valued (see Figure 3). These single stock strategies serve as benchmarks to demonstrate
how “conventional” fundamentalists and chartists trade given constant investment per
period |∆IC∆ | ≡ |∆IF∆ | ≡ ∆I being constant.
The strategies of ETF investors can have rather complex effects on the level of
individual stocks. Given the assumption that the index is overvalued and its price rises
(see Figure 4), ETF chartists invest, while ETF fundamentalists disinvest on average.
This implies interesting trade dynamics on the level of stock 1 in the case of the two types
of index investors. ETF chartists (E-C∆) implicitly invest less and less as the relative
price of stock 1, pi1, and thus its relative weight in the index declines (see Figure 2), i.e.,
the level effect of E-C∆ investment decreases as less money ∆I
E−C∆pii(t) is allocated
to stock 1 (see Equation (2)). At the same time the rebalancing effect, the second part
of Equation (2), calls for selling stock 1 to account for its reduced weight in net asset
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Figure 3: Investment ∆I`1 in stock 1 if the stock price rises more slowly than index price.
position IE−C∆ . Eventually, the rebalancing effect dominates the level effect and the
ETF chartists disinvest from stock 1 (see Figure 3). In contrast, ETF fundamentalists
(E-F∆) start off selling the overvalued index and thus disinvest from stock 1 at first.
Over time they disinvest less and less of this stock (see Figure 3) as its relative price
and thus its relative weight in the index decreases. While they sell ETF shares due
to the overvaluation of the index (level effect), they implicitly buy stock 1 to assure
the appropriate portfolio allocation (rebalancing effect). As the relative price of stock
1 continues to fall, the positive rebalancing effect eventually dominates the level effect
and ETF fundamentalists become de facto net investors in an overvalued stock.
Taken together and somewhat counterintuitively, ETF chartists end up disinvest from
a rising stock, while ETF fundamentalists invest in an overvalued stock. From the per-
spective of financial stability, ETF chartists tend to stabilize, while ETF fundamentalists
tend to destabilize this specific stock price development. Ultimately, the complex trade
dynamics are driven by the different investment strategies of the two types of traders
and the complex interactions between the market price dynamics of individual stocks
and the index, the relative market to fundamental price of individual stocks and index,
as well as the initial positive of negative net asset position of the investors. Appendix
A.2 analyzes in greater detail how these interrelations work to (de)stabilize stock prices.
Obviously, these counterintuitive effects only hold for the “outlier” stock 1, while for
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Figure 5: Investment ∆I`2−30 in stocks
2-30.
stocks 2-30 the effects of chartists and fundamentalists are as conventionally expected
(see Figure 5).4
3 Exchange-traded Funds and Market Dynamics in a Het-
erogeneous Agent Model
Based on the insights developed in Section 2 on the role of ETF traders for financial
(in)stability, we analyze in a dynamic HAM how the interactions of different types of
(ETF) traders affect asset price dynamics and financial market (in)stability.
3.1 Price Model and Trader Types
We base our analysis on a market maker HAM of the type analyzed by Challet et al.
(2015); Baumann et al. (2017b); Drescher and Herz (2012). In this framework, agents
decide on selling and buying assets with the market maker clearing the market and
adjusting prices according to the timeline depicted in Figure 6. In every time period
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, agents ` determine their net asset positions I`i (t), respectively their
investments ∆I`i (t), based on the market price of their target asset pi(t), their past net
asset positions I`i (t− 1), and their expectations of the fundamental value E[fi(t+ 1)].5
The market maker aggregates asset demand und adjusts the asset price according to
the pricing rule
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t) exp
(∑
`
∆I`i (t)/M
)
4Appendix A.3 contains two more examples, namely scenario 2: a rising stock in a bear market and
scenario 3: falling stock in a bull market with the index crossing its fundamental value from below. Also
in these cases, we can see the counterintuitive behavior of ETF traders.
5For HAMs in the context of bubble analysis cf. Baumann et al. (2017a); De Long et al. (1990).
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Figure 6: Timeline of actions and distribution of information for stock i.
with M > 0 as an overall scaling factor for trading volume and market power. As in the
discussion of Section 2, we distinguish between four types of traders depending whether
they invest in a single stock or an ETF index and whether they are fundamentalists
or chartists. In contrast to the above analysis in which traders could only invest or
disinvest a fixed volume of assets, we generalize the investment behavior so that traders
can also decide on the volume of their (dis)investment. The single stock traders invest
in all assets available on the market separately whereas the ETF traders invest in one
index reproducing these assets. At the beginning, the relative weight of single stock
and ETF traders is fifty-fifty. This becomes obvious when regarding the specific trading
strategies.6
Chartists (C) in individual stocks follow a feedback trading rule as introduced by
Barmish and Primbs (2011), namely
ICi (t) = I0 +Kg
C
i (t)
with an initial net asset position I0 > 0, feedback parameter K > 0, and g
`
i (t) =∑t
τ=1 I
`
i (τ − 1) · pi(τ)−pi(τ−1)pi(τ−1) as the overall gain of trader ` from asset i. The overall
initial net asset position of such a chartist is therefore N · I0 as he is investing I0 in
all N assets separately. The investment in asset i for t > 0 depends on the gain gi
6See, e.g., Timmer (2016) for the mapping of financial institutions and trading stategies.
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from the very same asset i, meaning that the single asset trader treats all assets (the
investments and gains) separately. Please note that these feedback traders are positive
trend followers only as long as they are long sellers. However, their overall investment
might also become negative, for example due to a large price decrease.7
Fundamentalists (F) in individual stocks follow the investment rule
∆IFi (t) = M · ln
E[fi(t+ 1)]
pi(t)
as also stated by Drescher and Herz (2012). Note that the fundamental value of asset
i, fi, is assumed to be noisy with all traders holding the same expectation E[fi]. The
single asset fundamentalist invests in all N single assets separately.
Analogously, ETF chartists (E-C) and ETF fundamentalists (E-F) invest according
to
∆IE−C(t) = K · IE−C(t− 1) · p(t)− p(t− 1)
p(t− 1) ,
respectively
∆IE−F (t) = M · ln E[f(t+ 1)]
p(t)
,
where the fixed initial net asset position of the E-C is N · I0. Investments into ETFs are
allocated to the individual stocks according to Equation (1). For simplification issues, we
assume that the F and E-F traders are very well informed in the sense that they exactly
know fi(t+ 1) resp. f(t+ 1). This simplification does not have substantial influence on
the results because in a bubble case the distance between the price and its fundamental
value becomes considerably large while the distance between a subjective expectation
of the fundamental value and its realization is (in probability) bounded. Thus, this
simplification has no influence on indentifying a bubble case as a bubble case resp. a non
bubble case as a non bubble case.
7Specifically, the chartist’s net asset position ICi (t) becomes negative if g
C
i (t) < − I0K holds for his
overall gain from asset i. Rewriting the chartists’ investment rule
∆ICi (t) = I
C
i (t) − ICi (t− 1) = K · ICi (t− 1) · pi(t) − pi(t− 1)
pi(t− 1)
indicates that in a situation with a price decrease (pi(t) < pi(t − 1)) and a negative net asset position,
chartists become short sellers, i.e., they invest despite the negative change in asset price. Taking literally,
they could be considered as “anti” trend followers in such situations.
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3.2 Simulation Procedures and Parameter Choices
In our Monte Carlo simulation analysis we consider a market with N = 10 stocks on a
time grid T = {0, 1, . . . , T} with T = 250. Each stock pi has a fundamental value fi,
i = 1, . . . , N , i.e., we have ten paths of fundamental values in one market scenario. In
particular, a market scenario is defined by the specific paths of these ten fundamental
values. Each of these fundamental value paths fi follows a geometric Brownian motion
with trend µ = 5%/T and volatility σ = 2%. The starting points of both fundamental
values and stock prices are set to fi(0) ≡ pi(0) ≡ 1, the scaling parameter is set to
M = 100. A greater M lessens the influence of traders and keeps the price process closer
to a geometric Brownian motion, while moving M closer to zero strenghtens the role of
traders and thus makes the price process more independent of the geometric Brownian
motion. Furthermore, we set K = 4 (Barmish and Primbs, 2011) and I0 = 10 for the
chartist. This model set-up is simulated 10,000 times, i.e., for the fundamentals of the
ten stocks we generate a total of 10 · 10, 000 different paths of a geometric Brownian
motion. The 10,000 scenarios of the set of ten fundamental value paths are the basis
for analyzing price dynamics for four different types of trader constellations, leading to
actually 4 · 10, 000 market developments. These markets comprise
• chartists and fundamentalists,
• chartists, fundamentalists, and ETF chartists,
• chartists, fundamentalists, and ETF fundamentalists, as well as
• chartists, fundamentalists, ETF chartists, and ETF fundamentalists.
We analyze how the presence of specific types of traders affects the (in)stability of
financial markets along three dimensions: the likelihood of bubbles as well as standard
deviation (sd) and excess kurtosis (EK) of the asset price series. An asset price bubble
is defined to occur if ∃t : p(t) ≥ 10 · f(t). Robustness checks find qualitatively similar
results for alternative definitions of an asset price bubble. We conducted tests also for
100 · f(t) and 1, 000 · f(t) and got similar results, see Appendix A.4. Note that if the
price of an individual asset explodes, then simultaneously also an index bubble occurs,
i.e., if ∃i : pi → ∞ ⇒ p → ∞. This correlation, that an exploding asset price leads to
an exploding price of the index, is important to understand index price bubbles.
The presence of certain trader types, especially ETF traders, might not only affect
the occurrence probability of asset price bubbles but could also influence the volatility
of stock prices. We calculate the averaged empirical standard deviation (sd) of the log
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returns in the non-bubble paths8 of the single assets, which corresponds to the historical
volatility, for the four types of trader constellations. To account for the possibility of
fat tails, we also measure excess kurtosis which accounts for the difference between the
kurtosis of an arbitrary random variable and the kurtosis of a Gaussian distributed
random variable (cf. Peterson et al. (2015)). In our case, the logarithmic returns of the
fundamental values are Gaussian distributed. Thus, if the asset prices follow a geometric
Brownian motion, their log returns should be mesokurtic with an excess kurtosis of about
0. In constrast, an excess kurtosis of greater zero indicates fat tails, i.e., a leptokurtic
distribution of the log returns.
3.3 Empirical Results
We base our empirical analysis on two alternative, albeit related definitions of bubbles in
a simulation framework. In a first step, we take the straight forward, natural definition
of a bubble, namely that we focus on market prices and consider each specific price path
in which a bubble occurs, independently of the underlying trader constellation; in a
second step, we focus on the underlying process of the fundamental values and consider
as bubble path all paths of fundamental values for which at least in one of the four trader
constellations a bubble occurs. This implies that in the case of the second definition, we
consider as non-bubble cases only paths of fundamental values in which for none of the
four market structures a bubble occured. The bubble cases of the first definition are a
subset of those of the latter one.
Based on the definitions of an asset price bubble, the simulation results indicate that
independently of the four types of market structure, in the overwhelming number of
simulation scenarios no bubble occurred, namely in 9,396 cases out of 10,000. From an
aggregated perspective, the likelihood of bubbles is highest (and above 4%) if either only
single asset fundamentalists (F) and chartists (C) are active in the market or if they are
joined by ETF fundamentalists (E-F) (see Table 1). In contrast, the bubble rate is far
below 0.5% whenever ETF chartists (E-C) are present. Somewhat counterintuitively,
chartists that invest in the market index seem to stabilize extreme asset price dynamics
in the sense that assets become less susceptible to price bubbles (see Table 1).
As alternative measures of financial (in)stability, Table 1 depicts the standard de-
viation sd1 and the excess kurtosis EK1 of the asset prices for the four types of trader
constellations in the respective scenarios without an asset price bubble. The averaged
standard deviation of the asset prices sd1 always surpasses the 2% standard deviation of
8A non-bubble path may refer to every single price path or the underlying fundamental value paths.
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Trader constellations
C + F C + F C + F C + F
+ E-C + E-C
+ E-F + E-F
Bubble rate 4.88% 0.29% 4.32% 0.23%
sd1 2.59% 3.39% 2.59% 3.47%
EK1 8.68 24.2 8.64 26.4
sd2 2.58% 3.39% 2.57% 3.47%
EK2 7.58 24.2 6.39 26.4
Table 1: Monte Carlo simulations: bubble rate and averaged standard deviation (sdk)
and excess kurtosis (EKk) of non-bubble scenarios.
the fundamental values. Interestingly, price volatility is highest and above 3% whenever
ETF chartists trade in the markets—a result which is on the one hand in line with other
studies on the destabilizing role of chartists (see, e.g., Drescher and Herz (2012)), yet on
the other hand is in contrast to the evidence on the financial instability as measured by
the likelihood of bubbles discussed above.
The results for the standard deviation are in line with the average excess kurtosis
EK1. In all configurations, log returns are leptokurtic, i.e., extreme values are more
likely than it would be the case under a Gaussian distribution as excess kurtosis is clearly
above zero for all types of market structures. Excess kurtorsis is particularly high with
values above 24 in market configurations with ETF chartists. This indicates again that
the presence of ETF chartists increases price volatility in the sense that extreme price
changes are more likely.
To analyze the marginal effects of the different types of traders we apply the second
bubble definition and consider each of the 10,000 paths of fundamental values sepa-
rately. To exclude that the high volatility/excess kurtosis in the market structures
including ETF chartists, namely trader constellations C + F + E-C and C + F + E-C
+ E-F, is due to the considered specific paths of fundamentals values, we also compute
standard deviation and excess kurtosis for the non-bubble cases of the second bubble
definition, i.e., for fundamental value developments where in no trader constellation a
bubble occurred (see sd2 and EK2 in Table 1). While for market structures includ-
ing ETF chartists E-C, there are practically no differences, whereas for the two other
constellations without E-C, the excess kurtosis is slightly lower.
To analyze the effects of the different types of traders on the market dynamics in
greater detail, we now consider each of the 10,000 paths of fundamental values separately.
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This allows us, for example, to check whether the 0.29% bubble cases of the C + F
+ E-C trader constellation are completely included in the 4.88% bubble cases of the
more general C + F structure or if the bubbles occurred for different fundamental value
developments. If the 0.29% bubble cases in the C + F + E-C scenario were completely
included in the 4.88% cases of the C + F scenario, we would conclude that indeed the
ETF chartists are able to prevent bubbles through their presence without causing new
bubbles, cf. Table 2.
Thus, for the detailed analysis, we check for each of the 10,000 fundamental value
paths whether or not a bubble occurred and if so, under which trader constellation it oc-
curred. The following example should help clarify the selection procedure. We take the
first of the 10,000 fundamental value simulations and see that under no trader constel-
lation did a bubble occurred. This situation is filed as no. 0 of our classification scheme
(see Table 2). For the second of the 10,000 simulated fundamental values, we might find
that a bubble occurred only when chartists, fundamentalists, and ETF fundamentalists
were in the market, but not for the other three trader constellations, leading to class
no. 4. For the third of the 10,000 simulated fundamental values, a bubble occurred only
when chartists and fundamentalists were in the market and for the market structure
with chartists, fundamentalists, and ETF fundamentalists (class no. 5). Table 2 depicts
all possible 24 = 16 constellations of traders, where ‘yes’ denotes a bubble occurrence
and an empty space denotes no bubble occurrence.
Differentiating the market structures, we find that 9,396 paths of fundamental values
are bubble free. In 148 cases, bubbles occurred if and only if the two non-ETF traders
acted (class no. 1). In 92 of the 10,000 simulated fundamental value developments, a
bubble occurred when chartists (C), fundamentalists (F), and ETF fundamentalists (E-
F) were present on the market (class no. 4 in Table 2). For other trader constellations,
there did not occur any bubble in the same 92 cases. This encourages the presumption
that ETF fundamentalists are bubble boosting in these cases. In 328 cases a bubble
occurred for exactly two of the four trader constellations, namely a) chartists (C) and
fundamentalists (F) and b) chartists (C), fundamentalists (F), and ETF fundamentalists
(E-F) (class no. 5). In the same 328 cases, when ETF chartists (E-C) were present as well,
the bubble could be prevented. This supports the conjecture that ETF chartists tend to
stabilize markets. All other cases (except for 1, 4, and 5) do not show a significant number
of bubbles. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the fundamental value developments
to the 16 bubble classes as a histogram. When having classified the fundamental value
developments into the 16 classes, the slightly higher values of EK1 compared to EK2 of
Table 1 in the cases without the E-C could be explained from the classes no. 1 and 4. In
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Trader constellations
No. C + F C + F C + F C + F #
+ E-C + E-C
+ E-F + E-F
0 9,396
1 yes 148
2 yes 6
3 yes yes 2
4 yes 92
5 yes yes 328
6 yes yes 0
7 yes yes yes 5
8 yes 5
9 yes yes 0
10 yes yes 11
11 yes yes yes 0
12 yes yes 1
13 yes yes yes 1
14 yes yes yes 1
15 yes yes yes yes 4
Table 2: Distribution of bubble events according to types of traders present in the market
(‘yes’ indicates a bubble occurrence for the specific trader constellation).
the computation of sd1 resp. EK1 for the constellation C + F, the 92 price paths of class
no. 4 where a bubble occurred for the constellation C + F + E-F are considered. For sd2
resp. EK2, these 92 paths are not considered. As especially EK2 is smaller than EK1,
the excess kurtosis in these 92 cases seems to be extremely high, which distinctly raises
the average excess kurtosis EK1. The same holds for the 148 price paths of class no. 1
the other way round. The excess kurtosis seems to be very high for the constellation
C + F + E-F in these paths, leading to a high EK1, but for EK2, these paths are not
considered. The 328 price paths in class no. 5 are neither considered for sd1/EK1 nor
for sd2/EK2 in the constellations C + F resp. C + F + E-F.
To better understand traders’ behavior underlying the observed price dynamics aris-
ing from different fundamental value paths, we discuss in greater detail the investment
decisions of ETF fundamentalists and ETF chartists in some interesting market config-
urations, namely classes no. 4 and 5 of Table 2. In the following, we analyze class no. 4
(bubble occurrence with the presence of E-F and absence of E-C) based on exemplary
market simulations whereas an examination of class no. 5 is performed in Appendix A.5
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Figure 7: Histogram of different bubble cases observed in the Monte Carlo simulation
with 10, 000 runs.
analogously.
Figure 8 depicts a typical situation with only a chartist and a fundamentalist trading
in the market and no bubble occurring. Fundamentals and prices, measured in monetary
units, of both asset i and index develop relatively steadily with more visible changes
around periods t = 120 and t = 210 (see Figure 8a). In particular, at about t =
210, the investments of both chartist and fundamentalist change substantially. Due
to a higher asset price pi and thus also a higher index price, the chartist increases
his investment, amplifying the price increase (see Figure 8b). As price surpasses the
fundamental value, the fundamentalist sells the overvalued asset. In this particular
situation, the fundamentalist’s selling seems to outweigh the chartist’s buying as the
asset price drops. The chartist’s gain turns negative and he does not only lose money but
also influence and impact on the asset market (ICi ≈ 0 at about t ≥ 220). Subsequently,
the fundamentalist keeps the asset price close to its fundamental value via his investment
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Figure 8: Market structure: single asset chartists and fundamentalists
decisions, a price bubble does not occur.9
Figure 9 depicts a situation with the same specific paths of the fundamental values
as in Figure 8, but with the ETF chartist as additional trader in the market. Again, no
bubble occurs. In contrast to the scenario with fundamentalist and chartist only, the
chartist does not lose all of his wealth. Due to the implicit investment of the ETF chartist
in asset i, its price decreases less and thus the chartist (C) does not stop investing all
together. Both the prices of the index and of asset i are very close to their respective
fundamental values (see Figure 9a). As the fundamental value of asset i has a positive
trend in this example, the fundamentalist invests in asset i.
In Figure 10, we again consider the same paths of fundamental values, however with
a chartist and a fundamentalist in single assets and an ETF fundamentalist trading in
the market. Even though fundamentals are the same as in the previous two cases, in this
constellation a price bubble occurs. In this example, we see that due to an increase of
the asset price around t = 210, the investment of the chartist strongly increases as well.
9The prominent price fluctuations at the beginning of the simulation are caused by the simultaneous
entry of all the traders.
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Figure 9: Market structure: single asset chartists, fundamentalists, and ETF chartists
The fundamentalist and also to some degree the ETF fundamentalist trade against by
disinvesting as both the asset and the index price exceed their respective fundamental
values. The prices of both the asset and the index drop but are still above their funda-
mental values. The chartist disinvests in the asset as he regards a negative trend in the
asset price, but also the fundamentalist and the ETF fundamentalist disinvest as prices
of both the asset and the index are yet too high. This causes an even more extreme price
decrease leading to a negative net asset position of the chartist which causes the chartist
to become a short seller.10 Short selling in an asset with falling price then generates high
gains for the chartist, which he reinvests in the next period. This investment causes the
price to rise that much (note that the traders’ investment decisions are directly linked
to the intensity of the price dynamics), such that the (ETF) fundamentalist cannot
compensate this increase (Baumann et al., 2017a).
Finally, Figure 11 depicts a situation with again the same paths of fundamentals
but with all types of traders investing in the market. Especially in Figure 11b, we see
that at about t = 210 the investment of C in the asset increases, also the investment
10This unintentional change of trading behavior is shortly discussed at the end of Section 3.1.
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Figure 10: Market structure: single asset chartists and fundamentalists, as well as ETF
fundamentalists
of E-C slightly increases. Both F and E-F subsequently disinvest the overvalued asset.
Compared to the case without ETF chartist, the single asset chartist loses less. The
ETF chartist implicitly stays invested in asset i via the ETF which in this situation
seems to prevent a too strong drop in asset price pi and subsequently a too strong shift
in the investment of chartist C thus preventing a bubble to occur.11
Altogether, these results indicate that ETF chartists tend to make the market more
unstable in the sense of a higher price volatility, while at the same time lowering the
probability of bubbles. We identified two behavioral characteristics of the participating
traders:
• The fundamentalist, respectively ETF fundamentalist, who are supposed to have
a stabilizing influence (as they reduce the distance between the price and its fun-
damental value), at times overcompensate the typical price destabilizing effect of
chartists initiating price oscillation themselves. The ETF chartist amplifies the
11See Appendix A.5 for a similar example for a situation in which a bubble occurs when chartist C,
fundamentalist F, and possibly ETF fundamentalist E-F trade (C, F resp. C, F, E-F), but no bubble
occurs with an ETF chartist in the market (C, F, E-C and C, F, E-C, E-F).
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Figure 11: Market structure: single asset chartists and fundamentalists, as well as ETF
fundamentalists and chartists
price trend but has a smoothing effect as he dampens strong price fluctuations in
single assets when he counteracts the overcompensation of the (ETF) fundamen-
talist.
• The ETF chartist transfers the volatility of one asset to the index, i.e., to all
stocks. When there is only one high volatile asset in the index, the same volatility
is reflected in the index, at least to some degree, as the index price is the sum of
the individual asset prices. Thus, the ETF chartist often adjusts his investment
in the index and therefore also in the other single assets. This raises the volatility
of these other assets even though their fundamentals were actually stable causing
the other traders to adjust their investment in these assets as well. This effect
imposed by the ETF chartist increases the general price volatility, which is in line
with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2016).
The absence of ETF chartists thus seems to have a double-edged influence, namely
asset prices are either kept more stable or are more likely to explode. As intuitively
expected, the volatility increases when ETF chartists act on the market but counterin-
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tuitively, the bubble rate decreases when ETF chartists are present. This unexpected
behavior seems to be in line with the motivating example presented in Section 2. As a
caveat we want to remind that our empirical results of Section 3 are based on simula-
tions and not analytically. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the findings are simulation
artifacts though the various simulations and robustness checks make this quite unlikely.
4 Conclusion
Exchange-traded Funds are easy to understand, cost-efficient ways of investing in stock
market indices that have become very popular for both retail and institutional investors.
The discussion of the wider repercussions of ETFs on the stability of the financial system
have just begun and typically focus on the astonishing growth of these financial products
and in particular the relative size of ETF index investors in stock markets. In our study
we focus on the investment strategies underlying the use of ETFs. We show that it is
not so much the size of ETFs that is relevant (cf. Appendix A.1), but rather how these
financial instruments are used in portfolio allocation, i.e., which strategy is used when
trading with them. Our empirical analysis indicates that ETF chartists significantly
change the market behavior in a more or less counterintuitive way. In contrast, ETF
fundamentalists do not change market dynamics in a substantial way.
Under the complex interactions caused by index investments on the price dynamics
of individual stocks, we find that the usual assessment that fundamentalists tend to
stabilize, while chartists tend to destabilize price dynamics does not hold in this con-
text. Rather the absence of ETF chartists increases the likelihood of bubbles. However,
measures of price volatility such as the standard deviation and excess kurtosis indicate
that ETF followers increase market volatility. Thus ETF chartists seem to have an all-
or-nothing effect on stock prices: On the one hand they increase asset price volatility
(in normal times), on the other hand they lower the probability of asset price bubbles
(thereby increasing the likelihood of normal times).
An important lesson to be drawn from this analysis suggests a refocussing of financial
market regulation. New financial products such as ETFs are not (de)stabilizing per se
and regulation should not (only) concentrate on their sheer size and speed of spreading.
Rather it is the specific use of these products that is of interest and should be the focus
of financial market regulators, an idea also suggested from the perspective of market
governance by Ockenfels and Schmalz (2016a).
When market stability is considered, usually volatility is used as a measure for sta-
bility. As our analysis shows, a high volatility does not necessarily imply a high bubble
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rate—quite to the contrary. Thus, it is questionable if regarding only volatility as a
stability measure is sufficient.
One last thing we learn from our investigation is that products seeming harmless at a
first glance like ETFs may have substantial influence on the market. Such new products
should therefore be scrutinized closely in particular with respect to alternative market
situations and trading strategies.
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List of Abbreviations and Symbols
C, C∆ chartist/trend follower/feedback trader
d destabilizing effect
E-C, E-C∆ ETF chartist/ETF trend follower/ETF feedback trader
E-F, E-F∆ ETF fundamentalist
E-H ETF buy-and-hold trader
EK excess kurtosis
ETF Exchange-traded Fund
F, F∆ fundamentalist
H buy-and-hold trader
HAM heterogeneous agent model
s stabilizing effect
sd standard deviation
? unknown (de)stabilizing effect
parameters:
f fundamental value of the index
fi fundamental value of asset i
I net asset position of the index
Ii net asset position of asset i
I0 initial investment of chartists
K feedback parameter of chartists
N number of assets in the index
M scaling factor for trading volume and market power
µ trend
p price of the index
pi price of asset i
σ volatility
t time
T termination time
T time grid
operators:
∆α(t) := α(t)− α(t− 1)
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A Appendix
This is the Appendix to the paper “Exchange-traded Funds and Financial Stability”
by Michael Heinrich Baumann, Michaela Baumann, and Bernhard Herz, University of
Bayreuth, Germany, February 2017. Here, we provide some basic analytic results, ro-
bustness checks, as well as a few more examples, simulations, and insights.
A.1 Further Basic Analytical Results
In this section, before analyzing the buy-and-hold trader as a very straightforward kind
of trader, we show that a trader’s outcome does not depend on whether he is buying ETF
shares or whether the trader is investing directly in the underlying stocks according to
Equation (1). Although it can be expected that investing in an index or directly in stocks
does not make any difference, in real-world markets it can be observed that indices are
more volatile than the underlying assets, i.e., that people are more often shifting their
index investments than their direct asset investments (Shiller, 1980). More precisely,
we show that if a trader is investing directly in assets with the same weighting as these
assets have in the index, then his total gain is the same as he would have invested the
same sum in the index. With
∆g`i (t) = I
`
i (t− 1) ·
∆pi(t)
pi(t− 1)
as the period gain of trader ` at time t from stock i when investing I`i (t − 1) at time
t− 1 in stock i we propose the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The total profit up to period t
g`(t) =
t∑
τ=1
N∑
i=1
I`i (τ − 1) ·
pi(τ)− pi(τ − 1)
pi(τ − 1)
of investing in all stocks (1, . . . , N) of trader ` selecting his portfolio according to Equa-
tion (1) only depends on his cumulated investment I` over all stocks and on the index’s
return on investment. In particular, for the period gain ∆g`(t) = g`(t) − g`(t − 1) it
holds
∆g`(t) = I`(t− 1) · p(t)− p(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
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which adds up to a total gain of
g`(t) =
t∑
τ=1
I`(τ − 1) · p(τ)− p(τ − 1)
p(τ − 1) .
Proof. Exploiting Equation (1) leads to:
∆g`(t) =
N∑
i=1
I`(t− 1) · pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1) ·
pi(t)− pi(t− 1)
pi(t− 1)
=
N∑
i=1
I`(t− 1) · pi(t)− pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
= I`(t− 1) · p(t)− p(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
Adding up over the time periods leads to the specified total gain formula which is
independent of the single asset investments.
Next, we will see that for a buy-and-hold trader there is no difference between directly
investing in the index’s stocks 1, . . . , N or investing in an ETF, i.e., his investment
decisions are the same in both cases. Even if the proposed property seems to be obvious,
a priori it is not. Since ETF buy-and-hold traders reallocate there investment due to the
rebalancing effect, the behavior of this traders is worth investigation. A buy-and-hold
trader (H) as well as an ETF buy-and-hold trader (E-H) buys a specific amount of assets
at a certain point of time and keeps these assets irrespective of their price development.
Specifically, the net asset position of an ETF buy-and-hold trader is given by
IE−H(t) = IE−H(0) + gE−H(t)
= IE−H(t− 1) + IE−H(t− 1) · p(t)− p(t− 1)
p(t− 1) (3)
= IE−H(t− 1) · p(t)
p(t− 1)
since gE−H(t) is exactly his shares’ increase in value. For a “normal” buy-and-hold
trader directly investing in stock i, it holds
IHi (t) = I
H
i (0) + g
H
i (t)
= IHi (t− 1) + IHi (t− 1) ·
pi(t)− pi(t− 1)
pi(t− 1)
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= IHi (t− 1) ·
pi(t)
pi(t− 1)
where gi(t) denotes the cumulated gain of stock i up to time t.
Proposition 3. The investment decision for stock i is the same for buy-and-hold traders
directly investing in the index’s stocks and for buy-and-hold traders investing in the
ETF.
Proof. We use mathematical induction for proving Proposition 3 and show
IHi (t− 1) = IE−Hi (t− 1)⇒ ∆IHi (t) = ∆IE−Hi (t).
We define roi(t) := p(t)−p(t−1)p(t−1) and roii(t) :=
pi(t)−pi(t−1)
pi(t−1) . Note that for buy-and-hold
traders the investment equals the period gain, i.e., the change of total gain ∆gHi (t), as
they do not change the invested amount subsequently. With Equation (2) the investment
in an individual stock is given by
∆IE−Hi (t) = ∆I
E−H(t)pii(t) + IE−H(t− 1)∆pii(t)
=
(
IE−H(t)− IE−H(t− 1)) pi(t)
p(t)
+ IE−H(t− 1) (pii(t)− pii(t− 1))
(3)
= IE−H(t− 1)roi(t) · pi(t)
p(t)
+ IE−H(t− 1)
(
pi(t)
p(t)
− pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
)
= IE−H(t− 1)
(
p(t)
p(t− 1) ·
pi(t)
p(t)
− pi(t)
p(t)
+
pi(t)
p(t)
− pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
)
= IE−H(t− 1)
(
pi(t)
p(t− 1) −
pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
)
=
IE−Hi (t− 1)
pii(t− 1) ·
pi(t)− pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
= IE−Hi (t− 1) ·
p(t− 1)
pi(t− 1) ·
pi(t)− pi(t− 1)
p(t− 1)
= IE−Hi (t− 1)roii(t)
= ∆IHi (t).
This equation shows that the buy-and-hold trader is of no interest for us in the
analyses of this paper as mentioned although the E-H trader consistently reallocates his
investment because of ∆pii in Equation (2). But this reallocation resp. the E-H trader
has the same effects on the market as the “normal” buy-and-hold trader has.
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A.2 (De)Stabilizing Effects of ETF traders
In this section, we examine and summarize the (de)stabilizing effects of ETF trading for
ETF fundamentalists (Table 3) and ETF chartists (Table 4) on one single asset i. Alto-
gether, we identified two influencing characteristics on the development of asset i for the
E-F∆ and two slightly different characteristics for the E-C∆ derived from Equation (2)
and two trader independent characteristics.
The influencing characteristics of the E-F∆ are his previous net asset position and his
decision about investing or disinvesting depending on the ratio of (expected) fundamental
value and price.
• In the past, the index has rather been under-/overvalued, leading to a positive net
asset position (IE−F∆(t−1) > 0) of the E-F∆ or to a negative one (IE−F∆(t−1) <
0).
• The index is now undervalued (f(t+1)p(t) > 1) or overvalued (f(t+1)p(t) < 1).
The influencing characteristics of the E-C∆ are his previous net asset position and his
decision about investing or disinvesting depending on the observed rising or falling price.
• In the past, the index has rather been increasing/decreasing, leading to a positive
net asset position (IE−C∆(t−1) > 0) of the E-C∆ or to a negative one (IE−C∆(t−
1) < 0).
• The price of the index is now increasing ( p(t)p(t−1) > 1) or decreasing ( p(t)p(t−1) < 1).
Independent of the two ETF trader types, the change of the relative weight of asset i in
the index is of importance (also taken from Equation (2)) as well as the price pi of asset
i compared to its fundamental value fi, which is exactly the basis for calling a certain
investment stabilizing or destabilizing:
• The relative share of asset i in the index can be either increasing (∆pii(t) > 0) or
decreasing (∆pii(t) < 0).
• The ith asset is now undervalued (fi(t+1)pi(t) > 1) or overvalued (
fi(t+1)
pi(t)
< 1). This
parameter is needed for determining the stabilizing or destabilizing effect of the
respective trader.
Combining these effects, we determine the sign of the investment decision for the
ith asset. We characterize an investment as destabilizing (d) if traders disinvest in
an undervalued asset or invest in an overvalued one. An investment is considered as
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Effects of E-F∆
fi(t+1)
pi(t)
> 1 fi(t+1)pi(t) < 1
∆pii(t) > 0 ∆pii(t) < 0 ∆pii(t) > 0 ∆pii(t) < 0
IE−F∆(t− 1) > 0
f(t+1)
p(t) > 1 s ? d ?
f(t+1)
p(t) < 1 ? d ? s
IE−F∆(t− 1) < 0
f(t+1)
p(t) > 1 ? s ? d
f(t+1)
p(t) < 1 d ? s ?
Table 3: Price dynamics imposed by past net asset position, over-/undervaluated index,
over-/undervaluated asset, and increasing/decreasing relative share of the asset in the
index leading to (de)stabilizing effects of ETF fundamentalists.
Effects of E-C∆
fi(t+1)
pi(t)
> 1 fi(t+1)pi(t) < 1
∆pii(t) > 0 ∆pii(t) < 0 ∆pii(t) > 0 ∆pii(t) < 0
IE−C∆(t− 1) > 0
p(t)
p(t−1) > 1 s ? d ?
p(t)
p(t−1) < 1 ? d ? s
IE−C∆(t− 1) < 0
p(t)
p(t−1) > 1 ? s ? d
p(t)
p(t−1) < 1 d ? s ?
Table 4: Price dynamics imposed by past net asset position, increasing/decreasing index
price, over-/undervaluated asset, and increasing/decreasing relative share of the asset in
the index leading to (de)stabilizing effects of ETF chartists.
stabilizing (s), if traders invest in an undervalued asset or disinvest in an overvalued
one. In the cells marked with a questionmark (?), the direction of the investment cannot
be determined in general without knowing the particular values. This is the case when
one summand is positive and the other one is negative in Equation (2). Consider,
for example, the cell of the first row and the first column of Table 3. According to
Equation (2), a positive net asset position together with a rising ratio of asset i (i.e.,
IE−F∆(t)∆pii(t) > 0) plus an undervalued index price resulting in a positive investment
(i.e., ∆IE−F∆(t)pii(t) > 0 where pii(t) > 0 for all t) leads to a positive investment in
asset i (i.e., ∆IE−F∆i (t) > 0). Together with the condition of undervaluation of asset i
(fi(t+1)pi(t) > 1), the ETF fundamentalist’s effect on asset i is stabilizing. In contrast, if asset
i is overvalued (first row, third column of Table 3), his effect on asset i is destabilizing.
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Note that the 16 cases in the two tables are not the same for E-F∆ and E-C∆. For ETF
fundamentalists, the ratio between fundamental value of tomorrow and price of today
is important whereas for ETF chartists the ratio of today’s price and yesterday’s price
is of interest. For better clarity we only consider the relevant market characteristics for
the different trader types and also skipped the equality cases (= 0 or = 1).
A.3 Further Market Scenario Examples
In the following, we show two further example developments for specific market situations
(scenarios 2 and 3) with T∆, F∆, E-T∆, and E-F∆. The traders as well as the background
are the same as in Section 2.
Scenario 2: rising stock in a bear market In the second case, we assume that the
absolute price of stock 1 rises with trend µ1 = 0.1 while the absolute price of the index
falls with trend µ = −0.1. As a consequence the relative price of stock 1 increases. Stock
1 is assumed to be overvalued, the index to be undervalued (t > 0). The fundamental
values of the stocks are again set to fi ≡ 1. Since stock 1 is overvalued and its price
increases (see Figure 12), fundamentalists (F∆) sell and chartists (C∆) buy this stock.
Since the index is undervalued and its price falls (see Figure 15), ETF fundamentalists
invest on average, while ETF chartists disinvest overall.
Figure 14 depicts the investment of the four types of traders in stock 1. ETF chartists
(E-C∆) implicitly disinvest more and more of stock 1 as its relative price pi1 and thus
its relative weight in the index rises (see Figure 13). The level effect of the ETF chartist
(E-C∆) causes a disinvestment in stock i which is even amplified through a high ratio
of stock 1 in the index. The rebalancing effect through an increase of ∆pi1 cannot
compensate this. In contrast, ETF fundamentalists (E-F∆) invest more in stock 1 as
its relative price (weight) increases. While they buy stock 1 as part of buying the ETF
due to the undervaluation of the index (level effect), they overproportionally buy stock
1 due to its high ratio in the index, which is even increasing (rebalancing effect). The
investment in the other assets (Figure 16) does not show significant changes over time.
Again we find the counterintuitive effects that implicitly ETF fundamentalists buy an
overvalued stock thereby destabilizing the market, while ETF chartists sell a rising stock
with a stabilizing effect on the market.
Scenario 3: falling stock in a bull market with the index crossing its funda-
mental value from below For the third scenario, we assume a bull market in which
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Figure 12: Price paths p1 of stock 1 and
p2−30 of stocks 2-30 in scenario 2.
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Figure 13: Change of the ratio pi1 and
pi2−30 of stock 1 and stocks 2-30, resp.,
in scenario 2.
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Figure 14: Investment ∆I`1 in stock 1 if this stock is rising when the index falls (scenario
2).
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Figure 15: Price path p of the index in
scenario 2.
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Figure 16: Investment ∆I`2−30 in stocks
2-30 in scenario 2.
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a specific stock falls. The index’s price starts below its fundamental value and is under-
valued at first, but later due to trend µ = 2 surpass its fundamental value. Stock 1 is
undervalued and its price falls against the general market trend with rate µ1 = −0.5 (see
Figures 17 and 20). For expositional reasons, the fundamental value of the index is set
to f ≡ 30 · 1.3, i.e., the fundamental values of the individual stocks are set to fi ≡ 1.3.
As has been discussed above, the calculus of ETF and single stock chartists and
fundamentalists is straightforward. In the case of index investors, ETF chartists invest,
while ETF fundamentalists first buy the undervalued index and later sell the then over-
valued index ETF. In case of stock 1 fundamentalists invest as the stock is undervalued
while chartists sell (see Figure 19).
Again, we analyze how the investment decisions of ETF investors affect stock 1 and
how this compares to the behavior of investors that only target stock 1. ETF chartists
(E-C∆) invest overall due to the index’s rising price. On the level of stock 1 they
implicitly invest less and less as its relative price pi1 and thus its relative weight in the
index declines (see Figure 18). The level effect of E-C∆ investment decreases as less
of the newly invested money ∆IE−C∆ is allocated to stock 1, and due to rebalancing,
E-C∆ investors sell stock 1 to account for the reduced weight of stock 1 in their overall
portfolio IE−C∆ .
ETF fundamentalists (E-F∆) pursue similar investments as long as stock 1 is un-
dervalued (see Figure 19). Once the index’s price surpasses its fundamental value they
switch to selling the index and implicitly stock 1 due to the overvaluation of the in-
dex (see Figure 20). Due to the need to rebalance their portfolio because of the falling
relative weight of stock 1, they implicitly buy stock 1 to assure the correct portfolio
allocation. As the relative price of stock 1continues to fall the positive rebalancing effect
eventually dominates the level effect. In the mean time ETF fundamentalists have been
net sellers of an undervalued stock. The ETF fundamentalist’s investment behavior in
stock 1 suddenly changes although neither the trend nor the fundamental value of stock
1 changes. Concerning stocks 2-30 (Figure 21), we see that both the fundamentalist and
the ETF fundamentalist suddenly disinvenst when they get overvalued (Figure 17). This
behavior is just as expected.
To sum up, ETF chartists invest for some time in a falling stock, while ETF funda-
mentalists disinvest from an undervalued stock. Also in this case ETF chartists tend to
stabilize, while ETF fundamentalists tend to destabilize stock price developments. This
behavior is somewhat counterintuitive.
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Figure 17: Price paths p1 of stock 1 and
p2−30 of stocks 2-30 in scenario 3.
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Figure 18: Change of the ratio pi1 and
pi2−30 of stock 1 and stocks 2-30, resp.,
in scenario 3.
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Figure 19: Investment ∆I`1 in stock 1 if this stock is falling when the index rises and
crosses its fundamental value from below (scenario 3).
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Figure 20: Price path p of the index in
scenario 3.
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Figure 21: Investment ∆I`2−30 in stocks
2-30 in scenario 3.
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Trader constellations
No. C + F C + F C + F C + F #
+ E-C + E-C
+ E-F + E-F
0 9,396
1 yes 148
2 yes 6
3 yes yes 2
4 yes 92
5 yes yes 328
6 yes yes 0
7 yes yes yes 5
8 yes 5
9 yes yes 0
10 yes yes 11
11 yes yes yes 0
12 yes yes 1
13 yes yes yes 1
14 yes yes yes 1
15 yes yes yes yes 4
Table 5: Results of the Monte Carlo simulation. A bubble is defined via p(t) ≥ 100 ·f(t).
A.4 Simulation with Modified Parameters for Robustness Check
This Section shows that it does not matter whether a bubble is defined by p(t) ≥ x ·f(t)
with x = 10, 100, or 1, 000. The histograms and the tables are similar to the ones in
Section 3 as well as their interpretation.
In Table 5 and Figure 22 we defined a bubble when the price of the index fulfills
p(t) ≥ 100 · f(t). With this bubble definition, there is no difference to the case of
Section 3.3.
In Table 6 and Figure 23 we defined a bubble when the price of the index fulfills
p(t) ≥ 1, 000 · f(t). With this bubble definition, there is exactly one fundamental value
development which is classified in another class than in the case of Section 3.3. This
development is shifted from class no. 8 to class no. 0 meaning that the bubble that
only occurred in the market constellation with C, F, E-C, and E-F acting, dissolved
somewhere between a price of 100 · f(t) and 1, 000 · f(t) or, more likely, the new bubble
limit is reached a few time steps further beyond our simulation horizon.
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Trader constellations
No. C + F C + F C + F C + F #
+ E-C + E-C
+ E-F + E-F
0 9,397
1 yes 148
2 yes 6
3 yes yes 2
4 yes 92
5 yes yes 328
6 yes yes 0
7 yes yes yes 5
8 yes 4
9 yes yes 0
10 yes yes 11
11 yes yes yes 0
12 yes yes 1
13 yes yes yes 1
14 yes yes yes 1
15 yes yes yes yes 4
Table 6: Results of the Monte Carlo simulation. A bubble is defined via p(t) ≥ 1, 000 ·
f(t).
A.5 Exemplary Investment Development for Class No. 5 of Table 2
In this section, we provide and exemplary investment development of the Monte Carlo
simulation of Section 3 when a bubble occurs if only C and F as well as if only C, F,
and E-F are trading, but neither if C, F, and E-C nor if C, F, E-C, and E-F are trading.
The analysis and interpretation of these results are analog to that ones in Section 3.3.
Figure 24 shows a situation where C and F are acting on a market with a bubble
occurring at about t = 190. Figure 25 shows the same fundamental value development
but with an additional E-C on the market. In this case, no bubble occurs. In Figure 26
instead of an E-C, we have an E-F on the market together with C and F. The price
development looks similar to the that one of Figure 24 with a bubble occurring at about
t = 190. Instead, having all four trader types acting on the market, i.e., having C, F,
E-C, and E-F on the market, the bubble could again be prevented through the presence
of the E-C. This is shown in Figure 27. It may be conspicuous that the net asset position
of C and F after the prevented bubble is much more volatile than before.
38
Figure 22: Histogram of different cases observed in the Monte Carlo simulation with
10, 000 runs. A bubble is defined via p(t) ≥ 100 · f(t).
Figure 23: Histogram of different cases observed in the Monte Carlo simulation with
10, 000 runs. A bubble is defined via p(t) ≥ 1, 000 · f(t).
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Figure 24: Case C and F
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Figure 25: Case C, F, and E-C
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Figure 26: Case C, F, and E-F
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Figure 27: Case C, F, E-C, and E-F
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